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I.  DEFINING THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as an out-of-court statement that is 
offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted.2  Hearsay is traditionally 
excluded as evidence because the courts are concerned with protecting each party’s 
ability to rebut statements which are offered against that party.3  Hearsay deprives 
the party against whom the hearsay is offered of the ability to cross-examine the 
declarant in court to test the declarant’s memory, sincerity, perception, and narration 
                                                                
1J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of Law; B.A, University of 
California, Los Angeles.  I would like to thank my mother, Caroline Shen and my sister, Hua 
Tran; for their support, guidance, and encouragement throughout law school and throughout 
my life.  I would also like to thank Professor Roger Park of the University of California, 
Hastings College of Law for his supervision of this article. 
2FED. R. EVID. 801. 
3See ROGER C. PARK, DAVID P. LEONARD & STEVEN H. GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE LAW: A 
STUDENT’S GUIDE TO EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO AMERICAN TRIALS § 7.01 (1998) [hereinafter 
EVIDENCE LAW]. 
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of the statement.4  Cross-examination is critical because, “[t]he theory of the hearsay 
rule . . . is that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which 
may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to 
light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination.”5  
To ameliorate the rigid application of the rule against hearsay, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence have enumerated many categorical exceptions and exemptions.6  The 
exceptions exist for situations when the hearsay is particularly trustworthy because 
the out-of-court statement does not present the usual hearsay dangers.7  One such 
exception is the excited utterance exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), 
which states that regardless of whether the hearsay declarant is available to testify as 
a witness to be cross-examined, “[a] statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition” may be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.8  Professor 
John Henry Wigmore articulated three requirements in the exception: 1) a startling 
occasion 2) which generates a statement related to the circumstances of the 
occurrence 3) that is made before time to fabricate.9 
Excited utterances are said to lack the same reliability dangers as classic hearsay, 
and therefore may supplant in-court testimony, because the utterance is unlikely to 
be fabricated as there is no time for peaceful reflection and the utterance has not yet 
been subject to the influences of the adversarial court system.10  Excited utterances 
do not present the credibility dangers of hearsay because the immediacy of the 
statement to the exciting event when made during the period of heightened emotions, 
obviates problems of memory or insincerity.11 
The justification for the excited utterance exception stems from the reasoning that 
because the declarant is in an intensely stressful and highly emotional state, she is 
not afforded an opportunity to contemplate and therefore fabricate what she excitedly 
                                                                
4See Lawrence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974). 
55 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
6See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803 804, 807. 
7See WIGMORE, supra note 5, at §§ 1420, 1422; PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3, 
at § 7.12. 
8FED R EVID. 803(2).  
9See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1750 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976). 
10See PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3, at § 7.12; see also Tribe, supra note 4, at 
958-61. 
11See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1749.   
[The] circumstantial guarantee here consists in the consideration, already noted . . . 
that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the 
utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’s actual 
impressions and belief.  The utterance it is commonly said must be “spontaneous,” 
“natural,” “impulsive,” “instinctive,” “generated by an exciting feeling which extends 
without let or breakdown from the moment of the event they illustrate.” 
Id.  Additionally, from the requirement that the statement be made during a period where the 
declarant is subject to the “stress of continuous excitement,” stems an implicit time element 
that suggests that such statements generally must be made contemporaneously with the 
exciting event. 
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declares.12  Professor Wigmore has articulated the earliest restatement of the 
principles underlying the modern exception: 
[U]nder certain circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous 
excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and 
removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a 
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions 
already produced by the external shock.  Since this utterance is made 
under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and 
during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have 
been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be 
taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least as lacking the usual grounds 
of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the 
speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be 
received as testimony to those facts.13   
Therefore, the excited statement lacks traditionally obscuring factors common to 
hearsay because the declarant’s “mind has been suddenly made subject to an 
overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence.”14 
II.  RAMIFICATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
AFTER THE REEXCITEMENT ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN UNITED STATES V. NAPIER 
The current application of the excited utterance exception is contentious, namely 
because of the divergent court interpretations of the timing element and the cause of 
the excitement element.  Critics claim that these prongs have been applied 
inconsistently and have become increasingly more relaxed in recent years.  Perhaps 
one of the more controversial applications of these two prongs rests in the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Napier.15 
In Napier, the defendant was alleged of kidnapping a female victim after stealing 
her vehicle and beating her severely.16  The victim’s blood and hair and the 
defendant’s fingerprints were found on a broken rifle, which was discovered beside 
the victim’s unconscious body.17  Though the rifle alone provided evidence which 
substantially implicated the defendant, his fingerprints were also discovered on the 
steering wheel of the victim’s vehicle, and his personal documents and other items 
were discovered inside the victim’s purse.18 
                                                                
12See PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3, at § 7.12. 
13WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1747. 
14Lira v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 384 Pa. Super. 503, 512 (1989).  But see Robert M. 
Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Note, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous 
Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928) (noting that excitement may actually impair 
rather than improve accuracy of observation). 
15518 F.2d 316, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1975). 
16Id. at 317. 
17Id. 
18Id. 
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The victim—who had suffered significant brain damage as a result of the vicious 
attack—was hospitalized for approximately seven weeks, during which time she 
underwent two brain operations in an attempt to mitigate the damage incurred from 
her head injuries.19  The serious injuries resulting from the ordeal left the victim 
unable to comprehend the significance of an oath and incapable to testify at a trial.20  
Although the victim’s communication was limited to isolated words and simple 
phrases frequently precipitated by stress and strain, the hospital found that her 
memory remained intact.21  A week after the victim was released from the hospital, 
her sister showed her a newspaper article.22  The newspaper article contained a 
photograph of the defendant, her alleged attacker.23  Upon viewing the photograph, 
the victim began to show immediate signs of apprehension, great distress, and horror.  
The victim pointed directly to the defendant’s photograph and repeating frantically, 
“He killed me!”24  The Ninth Circuit held that the victim’s out-of-court statement 
was admissible under the excited utterance exception, even though the utterance took 
place a considerable time (more than eight weeks) after her physical attack.25   
The facts in Napier consist of two “exciting” events: 1) the original attack and 2) 
the event of the victim viewing the attacker’s photograph in the newspaper.26  
Normally, one would classify the events consisting of the physical attack and the 
kidnapping as the “exciting event” that triggered the utterance.  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, found that the startling event of physically viewing the photograph of her 
attacker fulfilled the “exciting event” prong of the excited utterance exception.27   
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Napier is particularly disconcerting because it 
potentially permits excited utterances into evidence where there have been two 
“exciting events,” but only the first is objectively exciting enough to satisfy the dual 
                                                                
19Id. 
20Id. 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24Id. 
25Id. at 318. 
26See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Excited Utterances and Family Violence, 15 CRIM. JUST. 39, 
39-40 (2001).   
What makes Napier atypical is that the attack, which was too far removed from the 
statement for the declarant to have remained continuously under its influence, was not 
the startling event.  When the court of appeals agreed that the statement was 
admissible, despite the fact that a week had passed since the assault, it was because it 
was based on another startling event: i.e., the recognition of the assailant in the 
newspaper.  The statement was clearly made under the influence of that startling 
event, and the court assumed that the statement was sufficiently related to that event to 
be admissible under Rule 803(2).   
Id. 
27Napier, 518 F.2d at 318. 
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protections of the excited utterance exception.28  The following hypothetical 
situations illustrate the problems raised by Napier’s use of the reexcitement analysis 
in the excited utterance hearsay exception.   
A.  Hypothetical # 1 
Strictly applying Napier, excited statements made by a victim after identifying 
her accused attacker from a lineup would be admissible, even though the victim may 
have been contaminated by post-event information (such as photo arrays of potential 
suspects).  Thus, the victim may recognize an individual in the lineup only because 
of this information without consciously realizing it.  Furthermore, because the law 
enforcement officials who conduct the lineup know who the suspect is, they also 
may subtly or blatantly influence the identification.  The victim has likely been the 
subject of several police interrogations and has been subject to the considerable 
pressures of influential questioning.  Despite these compromising factors, the victim 
could still circumvent potential hearsay challenges to the protracted duration of time 
elapsing from her original attack, by claiming that the subsequent event of “viewing 
the accused”—not the original attack—was the traumatizing event which triggered 
her excitement.  The possible admission of this statement is especially problematic 
because there should be no “case in any jurisdiction which stands for the proposition 
that a request to identify followed by a deliberate choosing of an offender from a 
lineup . . . qualifies as an excited utterance.”29  Nevertheless, the reexcitement theory 
has already been applied to admit assertive conduct by a victim upon viewing her 
assailant in a lineup under the excited utterance exception.30 
B.  Hypothetical # 2 
An exculpatory statement made by an accused murderer during her arrest, days 
after the murder, could also be admissible under a mechanical application of Napier, 
even though the murderer had ample time to contemplate her actions or to be 
prejudiced by outside influences.  The murderer could evade using the murder as the 
exciting event, by instead referencing the event of the arrest—though days after the 
original murder—as the agitating and highly emotional event which triggered the 
statement.   
Clearly, such declarations in the preceding hypotheticals were not intended to be 
protected under the excited utterance exception either by the drafters of the Federal 
Rules or by Professor Wigmore, the central proponent of the modern day excited 
utterance exception.  To admit such statements might unduly expand the excited 
utterance exception, because under the reexcitement analysis, statements triggered by 
objectively calm events—events which may be subjectively exciting only to the 
                                                                
28An excited utterance is considered more trustworthy because an agitated individual who 
has no time to peacefully reflect upon the exciting event is unlikely to fabricate his statements 
and has not yet been subjected to the influence of an adversarial court system. 
29Johnson v. State, 934 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ark. 1996). 
30See State v. Meyer, 694 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that assertive 
conduct by a rape victim who was “shaking,” “fearful,” and “noticeably affected” by 
spontaneously recoiling upon viewing her alleged rapist in a lineup fulfilled the requirements 
of an excited utterance under the Napier reexcitement analysis). 
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specific declarant—could be admissible.31  Furthermore, the reexcitement application 
to the excited utterance exception raises profound questions because  
[i]n most cases, the nexus (if it exists) is a direct one, for the utterance 
describes an exciting event that is itself the subject matter of the case . . . . 
(“Most often the excited utterance, as a practical matter, relates to the 
exciting cause, i.e., description of an accident, an attack . . .”). Where an 
exciting event is the stimulus for a statement about something other than 
that event, a concern arises that the declarant might be speaking from 
conscious reflection, and hence the statement’s reliability is in doubt.32  
Under the reexcitement analysis, the nexus between the exciting event and the 
statement is too far removed because the statement is actually triggered by another 
event that reexcites a memory of the initial event, rather than the “exciting event” 
alone.33 
III.  DANGERS PRESENT IN THE REEXCITEMENT ANALYSIS 
No hearsay exception can perfectly distinguish between statements that are 
fabricated or truthful; however, the purpose of the excited utterance exception is to 
use palpable evidence such as lapse of time, the occurrence of an exciting event and 
a highly emotional state to best gauge accuracy and trustworthiness.34  Elements of 
the exception cannot stand alone; they must each work in unison for an outside 
observer to make a fully informed conjecture about the declarant’s reliability.  “The 
defendant’s only protection against the admission of fabricated testimony or [an] 
unfounded rumor is that there be sufficient safeguards to assure the statement’s 
reliability.”35  Excited utterances are only reliable if they are not subject to external 
influences and there has been insufficient time and capacity for the declarant to 
engineer a false statement.36  Unfortunately, these policy justifications behind the 
excited utterance exception may not be fully considered under the reexcitement 
analysis. 
                                                                
31One court has observed that “[t]he uniquely subjective nature of the determination of 
what constitutes a sufficiently startling event is vividly illustrated in United States v. Napier.”  
State v. Carlson, 808 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Or. 1991) (emphases added). 
32Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143, 147-48 (Mass. 2002) (citations omitted). 
33See State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn. 1997) (“Although the ‘startling event’ 
is usually the act or transaction upon which the legal controversy is based . . . the exception is 
not limited to statements arising directly from such events; rather, a subsequent startling event 
or condition which is related to the prior event can produce an excited utterance.”); State v. 
DiBartolo, No. 17261-9-III 2000 WL 968474, at *14 (Wash. Ct. App. 3, July 13, 2000) (“The 
startling event or condition need not be the ‘principal act’ underlying the case.  For example, a 
later startling event may trigger associations with an original trauma, recreating the stress 
earlier produced and causing the person to exclaim spontaneously.”) (citations omitted). 
34See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1750. 
35Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New York: 
The Door Opens Wide, Or Just a Crack? 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 171, 179 (2002) 
(emphasis added). 
36See PARK ET. AL., EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 3, at § 7.12. 
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As the preceding hypotheticals illustrate, the court’s reasoning in Napier fatally 
disregards how external influences on the victim might have tainted the reliability of 
the victim’s statements.  The facts indicate that the victim’s sister showed her a 
picture of the accused from a newspaper.  The facts, however, are silent regarding 
the context in which the picture was shown.37  Consequently, it is far from 
inconceivable that the sister—who, because of her relationship with the victim, had a 
possible bias in implicating the defendant—may have unduly influenced the victim, 
especially given the victim’s impaired capacity and highly vulnerable state.  That the 
sister deliberately showed the defendant’s photo to the victim itself suggests that she 
may have suspected the defendant.  Unfortunately, the failure of the Napier court to 
account for these highly germane external influences undermines the sanctity of the 
precedent establishing the reexcitement analysis of the excited utterance exception.38 
Napier’s assessment of how unique psychological states affect one’s 
trustworthiness is a meritorious consideration in applying the excited utterance 
exception.  There are an assortment of chronic psychological syndromes that do not 
fit cleanly within the excited utterance exception and consequently should toll the 
“excited state” requirement or allow for the statement to fall under the exception 
because it constitutes “reexcitement.”  Such chronic syndromes and mental 
impairments include situations where the declarant suffers from unremitting physical 
pain, or where the declarant is a victim of a psychologically debilitating crime such 
as rape or brutal physical battery.39  Following Napier, other courts have admitted 
excited utterances “made well after the event when the declarant was suddenly 
                                                                
37See Napier, 518 F.2d at 317. 
38See Holland, supra note 35, at 188 (“[A]ggressive questioning may undermine the 
reliability of a statement that otherwise would qualify as an excited utterance.”). 
39Professor Aviva Orenstein has spoken about how the documented reaction of women to 
rape and other sexual violence is plagued by preconceptions ingrained within the structure of 
the excited utterance exception on the appropriate reaction to highly emotional events.  Aviva 
Orenstein, MY GOD!: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 199-203 (1997).  The excited utterance exception is problematic 
because “[b]y requiring a prompt utterance and visible signs of distress, the excited utterance 
exception fails to reflect the reported experiences of rape survivors, who often are too 
disoriented, numb, afraid, or ashamed to issue a prompt statement, excited or otherwise.”  Id. 
at 163.  Furthermore, the excited utterance exception excludes “hearsay statements that may 
provide increased information and context, particularly where the survivor is traumatized, 
embarrassed, or is otherwise a reticent witness.”  Id. at 164. 
The excited utterance exception relies on the assumption that victims will immediately and 
passionately exclaim implicating evidence about their ordeal.  This, however, ignores the fact 
that female victims of rape may undergo a psychological paralysis where they may be 
uncommunicative and experience emotional withdrawal similar to the unconsciousness as in 
the Napier case.  Orenstein claims that “psychological data indicate that, as a self-protective 
device, witnesses may initially suppress unpleasant memories, which only emerge in later, 
calmer times [and] . . . the witness’ ability to recall will not be at its best so near in time to the 
traumatic event.”  Id. at 182.  Due to Rape Trauma Syndrome, “a rape victim may be calm 
directly following the incident and subsequently become agitated when feeling safe.  It is 
when the victim feels safe that the victim will be likely to report the details of the crime.”  
Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): Problems with the Excited 
Utterance Exception to the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 241-42 
(1999). 
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subjected to rekindled excitement” because “[e]vents may so deeply traumatize a 
person that long after stress has subsided a chance reminder may have enormous 
psychological impact, causing renewed stress and excitement and educing utterances 
relating to the original trauma.”40 
Questions pertaining to the psychological state of the victim raised in Napier may 
have surprising repercussions in cases involving conditions such as Rape Trauma 
Syndrome.41  Under a theory proposed by a scholar in this area, female victims of 
violence sometimes will not make excited statements regarding traumatizing events 
until after the danger has passed because of self-deprecating emotions such as fear, 
shame, and doubt.42  Furthermore, the liberalization of the standard of measurement 
for a “startling event” as seen in Napier has weighty implications in the realm of 
domestic violence law.43  In a relationship of constant domestic abuse, there could be 
                                                                
40In the Matter of Troy P., 842 P.2d 742, 746-47 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 
41See Orenstein, supra note 39, at 199-203 (criticizing the excited utterance exception for 
failing to encompass such gender-specific reactions to brutal crimes as the Rape Trauma 
Syndrome). 
42See id. at 204 (explaining a female victim’s reaction to rape if she is afflicted with Rape 
Trauma Syndrome). 
43The excited utterance exception has gained great importance in domestic violence cases, 
namely because “[a]round the country, a growing number of prosecutors now use the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule when attempting to prove their cases without the 
testimony of the victim.”  Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution of Battering 
Partners: Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 89, 107-08 (1997) 
(emphasis added).  Studies show that prosecutors use the exception as much as sixty-four 
percent of the time when the victim refuses to testify against her assailant.  See id. at 108.  One 
scholar writes that “[j]udges, who realize that abusers are unlikely to be convicted without 
victim testimony, have expanded the excited utterance exception to include statements made 
long after the underlying event.  In effect, these judges have used the law of evidence in an 
effort to curtail domestic violence.”  Jeffrey S. Siegel, Timing Isn’t Everything: 
Massachusetts’ Expansion of the Excited Utterance Exception in Severe Criminal Cases, 79 B. 
U. L. REV. 1241, 1267-68 (1999); see also Holland, supra note 35, at 175-77 (commenting on 
the extensive use of the excited utterance exception in the realm of domestic violence 
adjudication). 
It is reasonable to attribute the frequency of use of the exception to the atypical patterns of 
behavior and pronounced psychological ramifications in domestic violence cases.  “Domestic 
violence . . . can prove very unique it its ability to traumatize beyond the degree of any 
isolated offense that may be charged.”  Id. at 180-81.  In fact, “[c]reative prosecutors may 
attempt to use a defendant’s history of abuse against a complainant to help the court appreciate 
how a seemingly less serious incident—such as a defendant’s mere presence before the 
complainant—would prove most terrifying, let alone, ‘startling and upsetting,’ if considered in 
context.”  Id. 
The statistics documenting the frequency of domestic violence are profoundly disturbing, 
for “[d]omestic violence is a criminal justice and public policy epidemic of enormous 
proportions.”  Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic 
Violence for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2003).  “There has only recently been reliable data on the prevalence of 
domestic violence in the United States.  One out of every five U.S. women has been physically 
assaulted by an intimate partner.”  Id.; see also H. Morley Swingle et al. Unhappy Families: 
Prosecuting and Defending Domestic Violence Cases, 58 J. MO. B. 220 (2002).   
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many objectively calm events that could occur over the lifetime of the entire 
relationship that may be enough to constitute a subjectively “startling event” under 
the Napier analysis. 
One must clearly distinguish between the two problematic areas under Napier’s 
reexcitement theory: 1) the subjective/objective distinction and 2) the 
continuous/interrupted distinction.  It is only where a subjective test is applied that 
the time between the excited state and the statement is interrupted by an intervening 
period of calm that the reexcitement evils arise.  Merely having a subjective test, 
though, would not raise these problems if the subjective excitement were required to 
be continuous. 
IV.  REEXCITEMENT CASES AFTER NAPIER 
In the many cases following the Napier decision, courts have attempted to avoid 
confronting the thorny issues nearly asphyxiating the reexcitement theory.  
Generally, courts have reiterated that the Ninth Circuit’s Napier reexcitement 
                                                          
Although victims can be from either sex, the overwhelming majority [of the victims of 
domestic violence] are female.  More than two million women are assaulted by 
spouses or boyfriends every year.  A woman is abused every 15 seconds, making 
domestic abuse the leading cause of injury to women aged 15 to 44, accounting for 
more injuries than accidents, muggings and rapes combined.   
Id.  Linell A. Letendre, Note, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a 
New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973, 
976 (2000) (“Domestic violence affects more people than any other health-care problem in the 
United States.  The Department of Justice estimates that more than 800,000 women are 
assaulted, beaten, or raped by their intimate partners each year.”). 
Most important to the reexcitement analysis, “[a]lthough a [domestic] violence assault is 
undoubtedly a stressful and startling event, the victim may respond instead by withdrawing, 
becoming sullen, or going into shock, as opposed to conveying ‘excitement.’  In such an 
instance, failure of the declarant to be excited presents an arbitrary barrier to admissibility.”  
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to 
Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2002); see also Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal 
Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 687, 713 (2003). 
Given modern technology, rape cases are not so dependent on a victim’s hearsay 
statements: the presence of the defendant’s bodily fluid or other biological evidence 
on the victim’s person, coupled with bruises or other evidence that the victim withheld 
consent, would be a strong basis on which to prosecute a rape case even without the 
admission of the victim’s hearsay statements.  By contrast, a typical prosecution of 
domestic violence in state court depends more heavily on hearsay statements, either 
because the offender’s identity is not readily apparent from the physical evidence, or 
because the offender may try to ascribe the defendant’s injuries to a fall or some other 
“innocent” case.  Id. 
The Napier analysis, therefore, may contribute to aiding victims of domestic violence, 
particularly because the Ninth Circuit used a subjective standard based on the experiences of 
the victim to measure whether the event was sufficiently exciting.  In cases of domestic abuse, 
the victim may provide different statements regarding the defendant/abuser’s conduct at 
different emotional stages.  Furthermore, complications arise in this area of law because, 
though “[t]he length of time between the startling event and her statement is not determinative, 
. . . it is an important factor . . . . When domestic violence is part of an ongoing reign of terror, 
it is difficult to say when the violence starts or stops.”  State v. Mineo, No. 24993-6-II, 2001 
WL 30184 at *3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2, January 12, 2001) (citation omitted).   
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concept is legitimate, but confine the reexcitement theory to uniquely trustworthy 
circumstances or highly egregious facts.  Perhaps the most detailed case to undertake 
a comprehensive discussion of the reexcitement theory is Bayne v. State, a decision 
from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.44 
Similar to the facts in Napier, the facts of Bayne are emotionally compelling and 
involve a victim of a violent crime.  In Bayne, a five-year-old female victim was 
visiting the home of her uncle, aunt, and cousin, their male child.45  Upon entering 
the cousin’s bedroom, the uncle discovered the victim atop her cousin performing 
simulated sexual motions in a suggestive position.46  Upon his discovery, the 
victim’s uncle immediately accosted her and asked what she was doing and if anyone 
had taught the victim to act in that manner.47  The victim ran from the bedroom and 
seemed panicked and confused.48  The victim’s uncle then related the incident to the 
victim’s grandmother when the grandmother came to bring the victim home.49 
Later, upon arriving at the victim’s home (also the residence of the alleged 
defendant and the victim’s mother), the victim refused to go in, and began to scream, 
“No, no, I don’t want to go in, I don’t want to go in!”50  The victim continued to 
scream and remained upset even after her grandmother attempted to console her and 
ask what was wrong.51  The grandmother then drove the victim to a convenience 
store, where the victim told the grandmother, “I don’t want to go back in the house 
Mama.  Butch [the defendant] hurts me.  He touches me all over, he hurts me.”52  
The victim then made motions to her grandmother of how the defendant had touched 
her between the legs and on her body.53  Throughout the recitation of the ordeal, the 
victim was frightened, shaking, crying, and screaming.54  The victim was admitted to 
a hospital and the police were immediately notified.55 
At trial, the victim testified how the defendant had touched and rubbed his 
“privates” against hers.56  The victim’s grandmother also testified at trial of noticing 
bruises on the victim’s legs and buttocks and having previously observed the 
defendant entering the victim’s bedroom around 3:00 am.57  The court affirmed the 
                                                                
44632 A.2d 476 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). 
45Id. at 477. 
46Id. at 477, 490. 
47Id. 
48Id. at 490. 
49Id. at 477. 
50Id. at 478, 490. 
51Id. at 490. 
52Id. 
53Id. at 478, 490. 
54Id. at 490. 
55Id. at 478. 
56Id. 
57Id. 
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reexcitement theory set forth in Napier, and held that the victim’s excited statements 
were admissible under the excited utterance exception because the rousing event of 
being verbally disciplined by her uncle reexcited emotions stemming from the 
original molestation by the defendant.58  The victim was emotional throughout the 
twenty minutes which elapsed from her confrontation with her uncle, and therefore 
did not have the reflective faculties necessary to fabricate her statements.59  The court 
held as follows: 
[A]n otherwise qualified excited utterance that includes comments about a 
prior happening may be admissible under the excited 
utterance/spontaneous declaration exception to the happening may be 
hearsay evidence rule if the subsequent startling event that generates the 
utterance relates directly or indirectly to that prior event, i.e., is likely to 
produce an exclamation about the prior event. [There exists] a relationship 
between the subsequent and prior events . . . . The time between the prior 
event, the subsequent event, and the utterance are all factors that may be 
considered by the trial court in determining whether the utterance is 
indeed a spontaneous declaration or exclamation . . . . [T]he trial court 
judge is uniquely situated to make that determination.60 
Because the excited utterance exception focuses on the declarant’s mental ability to 
fabricate, not the amount of time that has elapsed, the court held that there was no 
reason “why a subsequent related startling event cannot be the startling event that 
produces an excited utterance about a prior event or why that excited utterance 
cannot be considered for admission under the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule.”61  The Bayne court, nonetheless, qualified the reexcitement rule: “The 
trial court, of course, would still have to consider all elements, including the passage 
of time and opportunity for fabrication or excuse, in resolving the issue of 
spontaneity . . . to rule on admissibility.”62 
Despite Bayne’s discussion buttressing the reexcited utterance concept through 
reasoning and extensive case law, Bayne suffers from the same critical flaw present 
in Napier—both fail to account for the external influences that may have tainted the 
declarant’s reexcited utterances.  In Bayne, the victim was calm from the period 
beginning with the confrontation with her uncle and ending when her grandmother 
parked in front of the convenience store.  The fact finder does not know whether the 
grandmother may have deliberately or inadvertently influenced the victim to accuse 
the defendant, especially since the grandmother provided the primary account of the 
events during the intervening period of calm.  One can surmise that perhaps the 
                                                                
58Id. at 492. 
59Id. at 491-92. 
60Id. at 489 (emphases added). 
61Id. (emphases added). 
62Id.; see also United States v. Hill, 13 M.J. 882, 885 (U.S. Armed Forces 1982) (“The 
factors to be considered [in determining whether the declarant is excited] include lapse of time 
between the startling event and the utterance, as well as, the declarant’s age, physical and 
mental condition, the circumstances of the event, and the declarant’s basis for knowing the 
statements to be true and accurate.”). 
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grandmother may have disapproved of the defendant living with the victim’s mother, 
and spoke to the victim suggestively before the child made her declarations.  Perhaps 
the child victim knew that the grandmother had a preexisting suspicion of the 
defendant, and only made her excited statement after her grandmother gave outward 
signs of approval.  Regardless of whether these proposed facts were present in the 
Bayne case, grave issues exist concerning the admissibility of reexcited utterances.  
If one allows the admission of reexcited statements, one is limited to the utterance 
alone and precluded from corroborating evidence of the pressures that may severely 
undermine its reliability. 
Other high-level state courts have also spoken to the reexcitement issue and 
affirmed the analysis both implicitly and explicitly: 
First, the startling event or condition that must occur for purposes of the 
excited utterance exception need not be the ‘principal act’ underlying the 
case . . . . For example, a later startling event may trigger associations 
with an original trauma, recreating the stress earlier produced and causing 
the person to exclaim spontaneously . . . . The second important principle 
regarding the requirement of a startling event or condition is that the 
startling nature of the event cannot be determined merely by reference to 
the event itself . . . . What makes an event startling is its effect upon those 
perceiving it, and an event might be startling to some but not to others.  
For purposes of the excited utterance exception, therefore, it is the event’s 
effect on the declarant that must be focused upon.63 
Of those state courts that contended with issues of reexcitement—through their 
state’s version of the excited utterance exception in their Rules of Evidence—they 
affirm the validity of the reexcitement analysis and find that, “a statement made 
several weeks after the original event may be admitted as an excited utterance 
because a second event was sufficiently startling to render the statement made in 
response thereto admissible.”64   
The reexcitement analysis is generally applied to cases where a statement of 
identification is made by a victim-declarant.  Similar to Napier, the highest court in 
Colorado has admitted the reexcited statements of identification by a child victim 
made upon viewing photographs of the alleged defendant.65  Other courts, too, have 
admitted reexcited statements that identify the perpetrator of the crime.66  
                                                                
63State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194, 197 (Wash. 1992). 
64See, e.g., Byrd v. Blodgett, 1993 WL 22372, *2 (9th Cir. Wash. Feb 2, 1993) (quotations 
omitted). 
65People in the Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312, 319 (Colo. 1982) (holding that statements 
made by a child victim upon viewing “photographs depicting persons who subject[ed] her to 
the mistreatment is a type of event which would engender substantial excitement in the child 
and . . . constitutes an independent predicate for admitting the statement as an excited 
utterance.”). 
66See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 694 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that rape 
victim’s reexcited assertive conduct of identification fell under the reexcitement theory 
advocated by Napier); People v. Grubbs, 112 A.D.2d 104 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1985) (holding 
that statements of identification made after a victim of attempted rape saw her attacker in the 
subway and became very nervous, upset, and fearful were admissible under the reexcitement 
analysis set forth in Napier). 
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Comparable to the facts in Bayne, New Mexico courts have also allowed reexcited 
statements made by a child victim upon being returned to the location where the 
original molestation occurred.67 
Another unifying similarity running through each of the reexcitement cases is the 
unique psychological ramifications that exist as a result of the original crime.  By far, 
the most vociferous proponents of the reexcited utterance standard are those courts 
overseeing cases of child abuse and molestation—a crime that has unique and 
profound psychological consequences.  
Two state supreme courts have controversially admitted reexcited statements 
made by children after emotionally waking from a dream about the original event of 
the abuse.68  Tennessee courts have also admitted reexcited statements by child 
victims when those statements are coupled with circumstantial evidence of pain in 
the genital area from urination.69  In fact, Tennessee courts have generally allowed 
excited statements when additional circumstantial evidence bolsters the 
trustworthiness.70  Further evidence that courts are more prone to apply the 
reexcitement analysis in cases involving child-victims, is when those reexcited 
statements are triggered by an everyday and commonplace occurrence.  The 
Wyoming Supreme Court admitted a statement made by a child victim of abuse 
when triggered by a regular activity of getting dressed for bed, while Washington 
Supreme Court refused to admit a reexcited statement triggered by an everyday 
occurrence involving an adult victim.71  Child abuse cases have also been 
distinguished from other cases when ruling on statements made to family members.72 
                                                                
67Esser v. Com, 566 S.E.2d 876, 879-880 (Va. App. 2002) (following the reexcitement 
analysis in Napier and Bayne in holding that statements made when the victim “believed she 
was to be returned to the place where she was assaulted and to the control of appellant, the 
man who had raped and sexually assaulted her” constituted excited utterances); In the Matter 
of Troy P., 842 P.2d at 743-747 (holding that a four-year-old girl’s near hysterical statements 
referencing a molestation occurring more than several weeks earlier constituted an excited 
utterance because the girl was reexcited upon being returned to the place where the 
inappropriate touching occurred). 
68See George v. State, 813 S.W.2d 792, 795-96 (Ark. 1991) (holding that statements made 
by the child-victim upon waking from a dream are admissible as a reexcited utterance); State 
v. Boston 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1231 (Ohio 1989) (holding that reexcited statements made by a 
child-victim upon waking from a dream are admissible under the excited utterance exception). 
69See State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that pain experienced 
by a three-year-old victim of molestation while attempting to urinate “as opposed to the sexual 
offense itself constituted a startling event” under the Napier reexcitement analysis, and 
therefore statements fell under the excited utterance exception). 
70See State v. Burns, 29 S.W.3d 40, 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (affirming Napier, yet 
finding that statements made after an emotional reaction to hearing the defendant’s name by 
the burned child victim did not fall under the excited utterance exception). 
71Compare In re Parental Rights of G.P., 679 P.2d 976, 1004 (Wyo. 1984) (regardless of 
whether the declarant’s “statements were triggered by the abusive act during her home visit or 
the subsequent pain [and reexcitement] she experienced while being dressed for bed,” her 
statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception) with State v. Chapin, 826 
P.2d 194, 198-99 (Wash. 1992) (affirming Napier’s reexcitement theory but finding the 
excited utterance exception inapplicable because there was a period of calm before the elderly 
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Interestingly, the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) 
cite Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead73, a case that preceded Napier, but may also be 
categorized within Napier’s line of reexcitement cases because the excited utterance 
there also refers to a past event.74  Unlike Napier and its progeny, however, the past 
event in Snead is objectively unexciting.75   
In Snead, a store clerk’s excited and nervous statement after a customer slipped 
and fell in his grocery store was found to be admissible under the excited utterance 
exception.76  The statement referred to the clerk’s observation that the produce upon 
which the customer slipped had been on the floor for several hours.77  The event of 
viewing produce on the ground, however, is not objectively exciting.  Upon seeing 
such items on the ground, a store clerk would likely foresee a higher likelihood of 
customer injury and thus have a duty to clean or remove the items.  The clerk, 
however, would not be so excited upon viewing the produce that his capacity to 
fabricate would momentarily be suspended. 
This case substantially augments the validity of the reexcitement analysis, 
because it is evidence that the Advisory Committee anticipated Napier-like cases 
where the excited statement referenced an unexciting past event.  That this case was 
explicitly mentioned in the Advisory Committee Notes is demonstrative of the 
Congressional intent behind the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Obviously, Snead was 
prominent enough for the Advisory Committee to take note of and use as a model to 
illustrate the allowable lapse of time in the excited utterance exception.   
If the Advisory Committee was willing to admit statements which explain and 
relate to a non-exciting past event under Snead, it is even more likely that it would 
admit statements which explain and relate to an exciting event under Napier.  Snead 
merely required that the statement result from a new exciting event when explaining 
another past, unexciting event.  Napier and its progeny, however, require that the 
initial event be exciting and that the second event both rekindle emotions from the 
                                                          
nursing home resident made his allegations of rape, and the statements were triggered by 
ordinary, not unusual activities by his caretaker/alleged rapist). 
72Compare State v. Owens, 899 P.2d 833, 836 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 1995) (questions by 
family members regarding an earlier molestation recreated the original stress; therefore, 
statements made by the child-victim immediately afterwards qualified as excited utterances) 
with State v. Henry, No. 9405000365, 1995 Del. Super LEXIS 185, at *3-4 (Del. Super Ct. 
March 24, 1995) (distinguishing Napier from facts where an elderly victim—who had broken 
his hip after being punched in the face by the defendant—trembled and wept while uttering, 
“he punched me,” while awaiting surgery, was not admissible because the victim had time to 
consult with family and was visibly calmer from the time of initial the battery unlike the facts 
in Napier). 
7390 F.2d. 374 (D.C. Cir. 1937). 
74Id. at 376-77.  The committee used the case to illustrate the distinction between the 
present sense impression and the excited utterance exception:  The excited utterance exception 
is broader because the admissible statement may address a past event.  FED. R. EVID. 801(1) 
and 801(2) Advisory Committee Notes. 
75Snead, 90 F.2d at 376-77. 
76Id. 
77Id. 
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initial event and thus generate an excited statement that explains the past event.  
Therefore, if the Advisory Committee consciously included Snead within the 
definition of the excited utterance exception, it must have also meant to include 
reexcitement cases like Napier, which are even more trustworthy because the earlier 
exciting event increases the likelihood that the declarant’s reexcitement was genuine 
and actually stilled his or her reflective faculties.  
Although the reexcitement theory has been uniformly acknowledged by state 
courts, it has not been subjected to extensive federal judicial criticism—the Ninth 
Circuit in its Napier opinion is the only circuit to speak dispositively regarding 
reexcitement.  The federal court progeny directly affirming the reexcitement concept 
consist of brief statements by military courts or unpublished decisions of the Ninth 
Circuit restating Napier’s holding and finding the reexcitement analysis inapplicable.  
One court aptly sums up the current state of the application of reexcitement as 
follows: 
The argument that statements made after one has calmed down can never 
be excited utterances presents an unsettled legal question. The implicit 
premise underlying the excited utterance exception is that a person who 
reacts to a startling event or condition while under the stress of 
excitement caused thereby will speak truthfully because of the lack of 
opportunity to fabricate . . . . This premise becomes more tenuous where 
the exciting influence has dissipated and one has had the opportunity to 
deliberate or fabricate. Even if one were to have a renewal of the stress 
involved in the original exciting event, the existence of a deliberative 
period increases the concern that subsequent statements will be inaccurate 
or contrived. On the other hand, some courts and commentators have 
accepted the premise that even after the excitement of a startling event has 
dissipated, a subsequent statement may constitute an excited utterance if a 
renewal of the excitement provides an adequate safeguard against 
fabrication.78   
Though there is no pronounced pattern of cases—either by state or federal courts—
directly addressing the ills arising from the reexcitement analysis, the reexcitement 
concept is but a part of a larger movement in evidence law—that pertaining to the 
subjectivization of the excited utterance exception—that has been heavily criticized 
by proponents of the objective res gestae standard.  
V.  EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION AND 
CRITICISM OF THE UNPRECEDENTED “SUBJECTIVIZATION” OF THE EXCITED 
UTTERANCE STANDARD 
Prior to Professor Wigmore’s definition of the excited utterance exception, 
scholars primarily used the res gestae doctrine to justify the exception.79  The res 
                                                                
78United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477, 483 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (quotations omitted) 
(emphases added). 
79The excited utterance exception is also referred to as the spontaneous exclamation or 
spontaneous declaration exception.  This alternative moniker is demonstrative of the res 
gestae origins of the excited utterance exception.  See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 268 
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999); see also Chapin, 826 P.2d at 198 (noting that the res 
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gestae doctrine focused not on the reflective faculties of the declarant, but on the 
strict contemporaneousness of the statement with the exciting event, so that the 
statement was essentially a continuation of the event.80  If the verbal response is 
made simultaneously with the exciting occurrence, it “can be considered part of the 
event which causes it.”81  The res gestae doctrine focuses on the insufficiency of 
time for—not the reflective capacity of—the declarant to fabricate or contrive any 
response, so that the hearsay statement is likely to be a truthful reflection of the 
declarant’s true observations or beliefs.82 
Wigmore’s endorsement of deliberation over spontaneity ultimately superceded 
the res gestae doctrine as the lynchpin to the excited utterance exception.83  
Wigmore’s modern psychological justification relegated the contemporaneous time 
requirement to only provide guidance as to whether there was any reflective 
capacity, so that the statement was not a result of fabrication.84  One author 
documents the evolution as follows:  “The excited utterance doctrine has evolved 
from the concept of res gestae, requiring simultaneity between the underlying event 
and the descriptive statement, to virtually abandoning a temporal requirement 
between the event and the statement.”85  Thus, the modern evolution has been a part 
of the gradual transformation of the excited utterance exception from an objective 
measure of excitement—only a short period of time is reasonable to maintain 
excitement—to a subjective measure of excitement—looking to that individual’s 
reflective faculties. 
Critics claim that the deterioration of the time requirement between the 
objectively exciting event and the utterance—as illustrated by Napier and its 
progeny—has resulted in erratic and increasingly relaxed applications by the courts 
                                                          
gestae doctrine was dubbed the common law equivalent of the excited utterance exception, 
and also that which the excited utterance exception was derived from res gestae). 
80See Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 244 (decrying the current premise underlying the 
excited utterance exception, and advocating a return to the res gestae analysis). 
81Id. 
82See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1745; see also MCCORMICK supra note 79, at § 268. 
83See MCCORMICK supra note 79 at § 271.   
Wigmore, however, saw as the basis for the spontaneous exclamation exception, not 
the contemporaneousness of the exclamation, but rather the nervous excitement 
produced by the exposure of the declarant to an exciting event.  As a result, the 
American law of spontaneous statements shifted in its emphasis from what Thayer had 
observed to an exception based on the requirement of an exciting event and the 
resulting stifling of the declarant’s reflective faculties.   
Id. 
84See WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 1756  
The declaration . . . may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, 
provided it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence 
continued.  It is therefore an error to apply to the present exception the verbal act rule 
that the utterance must be precisely contemporaneous with the act or occurrence.  
There was in the beginning a tendency to commit this error.  But at the present day 
this error seems to have been almost everywhere repudiated.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
85Siegel, supra note 43, at 1242 (emphasis added). 
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as to what constitutes a reasonable chronological proximity between the statement 
and the exciting event.86  This deterioration has led critics of the current 
interpretation of the excited utterance exception to disparage the focus on the 
declarant’s reflective faculties. 
The 803(2) exception’s greatest flaw inheres in the fact that there is no 
objective method of determining how much time may pass between the 
exciting event and the excited utterance.  Courts have, however, agreed 
that the excited statement does not need to be made contemporaneously or 
even on the same day as the exciting event.  This lack of objectivity leaves 
us with a rule that is lacking in uniformity, full of unpredictability, and 
unfair.87 
It is this evolution that has both defined and paved the way for the advent of 
reexcitement cases.  However, critics claim that this evolution constitutes an 
exorbitant pattern of over-expansion which eviscerates the underlying aims of the 
exception.88 
Critics disdainfully contend that the expansion of the excited utterance exception 
since Wigmore’s reclassification has destructively construed the composite elements 
of the exception as flexible guiding elements rather than mandatory to the 
functioning of the exception.  Without a bright line test clearly indicating to the court 
whether such evidence is admissible, there will be discriminatory and wavering 
application of the exception to facts that are remarkably similar, thus subjecting 
members of the public to a double standard.89  Furthermore, the judicial opinions that 
result may not be adequately challenged by the parties and may result in binding 
precedent, especially because “[l]itigants may not have the incentive or the resources 
to appeal decisions that are not clearly prejudicial or where the admission of hearsay 
did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.”90 
The intended beneficiaries of the increasingly subjective interpretation of the 
exception are those victims of particularly heinous crimes—especially violence or 
abuse against children, murder, rape, or domestic violence.91  However, the 
                                                                
86See M. C. Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 224, 243 
(1961) (looking at the prolonged duration of intervening time between the exciting event and 
the declaration). 
87Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 235 (emphases added). 
88See Siegel, supra note 43, at 1255-56 (providing illustrative case law from 
Massachusetts, documenting the pattern of courts allowing excited statements, even given 
evidence that the declarants were not excited and of the significant lapse of time); see also 
Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 236-44 (looking to demonstrative rape and child abuse cases 
which show inconsistency in the spontaneity of the statement after the exciting event). 
89See Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 250 (“The current predicament inheres in the ‘no 
time for reflection’ element, as courts make arbitrary and discretionary determinations . . . .  
Consequently, with regard to homicide, rape, and child abuse cases, courts utilize differing 
standards when applying the excited utterance exception, thereby resulting in unpredictable 
decisions.”). 
90Siegel, supra note 43, at 1264. 
91See id. at 1256-57 (commenting on the modern trend of expanding the excited utterance 
doctrine in several Massachusetts criminal cases, primarily in cases of murder, domestic 
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interpretation of the excited utterance exception has since increased beyond that 
realm.92  Although courts used their newfound discretion and flexibility to further 
public policy and make rulings that supplement areas where the law was traditionally 
lacking, their overly broad interpretations of the exception has admitted a copious 
range of statements that should not otherwise be admissible.93  Such statements that 
are used solely to support the sympathetic victim-declarant should instead fall under 
the residual exception, rather than disfiguring, manipulating, and compromising the 
excited utterance exception to the evidence at hand.94  Furthermore, “[i]f the balance 
of evidentiary issues needs to be shifted in favor of the prosecution, then the court 
should explicitly state such a policy.”95 
Critics further allege that though the evolution of the excited utterance exception 
may have been originally beneficial in protecting such victims, these victims are now 
protected with newly codified and more exacting evidence rules.  Those rules are 
better suited to them, because the rules expressly rid specific evidentiary barriers 
unique to those victims.96  Therefore, inconsistent precedent remains as a confusing 
vestige that weakens the original purpose of the excited utterance exception, 
excluding those who have made valid statements under the traditional definition of 
the rule.  One author suggests that “[t]o maintain the integrity of the judicial process, 
                                                          
violence, and assault); see also Conti & Gitnik, supra note 39, at 250 (commenting on that the 
courts use diverging criteria in applying the excited utterance exception to rape, child abuse, 
and murder cases); see also In the matter of Troy P., 842 P.2d at 747 (summarizing cases 
“upholding the admissibility of children’s excited utterances naming the defendant 
immediately upon awaking in the middle of the night”); see George, 813 S.W.2d at 795-96 
(holding that physically abused child’s excited statement made after a frightening dream 
admissible); State v. Boston 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1231 (Ohio 1989) (finding a molested child’s 
statement made after a nightmarish dream admissible as an excited utterance). 
92See Siegel, supra note 43, at 1275.   
By repeatedly expanding, and arguably effectively eliminating, the temporal 
requirement implicit in the excited utterance exception in the criminal context, 
Massachusetts courts have inconsistently applied the exception under a rationale 
which no longer holds true.  The term itself, whether spontaneous exclamation or 
excited utterance, includes the notion of an immediate or stressful condition caused by 
an underlying event.  Courts have contorted the exception in order to reach desired 
results or correct perceived social ills by permitting the introduction of hearsay 
testimony made substantially after the event.   
Id. 
93See id. at 1266-67 (noting that in general, cases in which the excited utterance exception 
has been expanded are “highly emotional events likely to inspire excited utterances, such as 
murder, assault, and sexual assault, and many of the cases involve children.”). 
94See id. at 1270-72 (explaining that explicit laws should be made to encompass changes 
in social policy, rather than awkwardly contorting a time-honored law). 
95Id. at 1271-72. 
96See FED. R. EVID. 413; see also FED. R. EVID. 414; Siegel supra note 43, at 1271-72 
(“other jurisdictions . . . explicitly recognize evidentiary rules based on social policies 
designed to achieve a desired application of substantive law” such as section 1370 of the 
California Evidence Code which “created a ‘new hearsay exception for a declarant’s hearsay 
statements narrating, describing or explaining the infliction or the threat of physical injury 
upon the declarant by the party against who the statement is offered.’”). 
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trial judges should restrain from admitting out-of-court statements into evidence 
under the current excited utterance exception.  Stretching the excited utterance 
exception undermines the consistency necessary in the judicial process.”97  The wide-
reaching inclusiveness of the rule now provides a gaping loophole for non-
meritorious statements to come in as evidence.98 
VI.  DEFENDING AND REIGNING IN THE EXCESSES OF THE EXCITED  
UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
The modern excited utterance exception, as illustrated by Napier, is not 
necessarily a lesser standard for the proponent of the evidence to meet; it is an 
exception that merely affords the district courts greater discretion99 in molding the 
                                                                
97Siegel, supra note 43, at 1271. 
98There has, however, been backing for the current state of the excited utterance exception 
from the highest judicial authority in the United States.  The greatest support offered for the 
modern day excited utterance exception is the positive affirmation offered by the Supreme 
Court in two cases dealing with the Confrontation Clause.  In a 1992 decision, the Supreme 
Court stated that “‘firmly rooted’ exceptions carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the 
reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation Clause.”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 
502 n.8 (1992).  Moreover, the excited utterance exception is a firmly rooted exception to the 
rule against hearsay, and therefore sufficiently reliable to protect the criminal defendant of his 
Constitutional right to confront all accusers: 
[T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontaneous 
declarations . . . is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide 
substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.  But those same factors that contribute 
to the statements’ reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony.  A 
statement that has been offered in a moment of excitement—without the opportunity 
to reflect on the consequences of one’s exclamation—may justifiably carry more 
weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement offered in the relative calm of the 
courtroom.   
Id. at 355-56. 
Additionally, in a 1990 decision, the Supreme Court found that showing “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness” required an analysis of the totality of the circumstances that 
surround the declarant’s making of the statement.  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).  
In dicta, the Supreme Court buttressed the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
underlying the excited utterance exception by stating that “[t]he basis for the ‘excited 
utterance’ exception . . . is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate 
the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is 
trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.”  Id. at 820. 
The highest court has endorsed Wigmore’s justification of the excited utterance exception 
and, therefore, has heartily agreed that a statement made in a highly excited state is 
trustworthy and reliable enough to pass the Constitutional requirements articulated in the 
Confrontation Clause because of the lack of reflective faculties to fabricate. 
Furthermore, res gestae critics of the excited utterance exception should be appeased because 
res gestae considerations are at work in many other accepted hearsay exceptions.  For 
example, “[r]es gestae also sired the hearsay exceptions for present-sense impressions, excited 
utterances, direct evidence of state of mind, and statements made to physicians.”  Orenstein, 
supra note 39, at 169. 
99Giving courts an exception based more on a subjective inquiry affords the courts with 
more discretion in admitting the evidence. 
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exception based on circumstantial evidence and the egregiousness of the crime—two 
elements which speak to the subjective excitement experienced by the declarant.100  
To understand one’s mental ability to fabricate requires the court to subjectively 
assess this situation and use its authority to balancing competing factors.  The 
exception still requires a showing of corroborating evidence that supports a court’s 
judgment that the declarant was subjectively excited.101  All laws made by Congress 
are to some degree either over- or under-inclusive, but courts, in applying this 
exception, may best minimize the misapplication of the law through the monitoring 
device of court discretion. 
In response to critics’ claims that the controversial evolution of the excited 
utterance exception has resulted in non-uniform and highly deviant cases—and now 
has the great potential for misuse because of inconsistent and complicated precedent 
and complicated cases such as Napier—one must document the actual usage of the 
exception.  Critics focus only on the ills that have resulted from use of the exception 
and not the wide-reaching benefits for those traditionally disadvantaged individuals 
such as victims of domestic abuse, child molestation, and rape. 
The excited utterance exception serves to illustrate the changing policy behind 
the law, and the evolution of the law to meet those new aims.  Just because there has 
been a shift in the application of the underlying principle of the excited utterance 
exception does not necessarily indicate that there has been a regression, but that the 
law has merely adapted its historical aims to new societal principles.  When the 
defendant has committed an egregious crime where the victim is historically not 
afforded enough protections in the law, the courts have intervened and used the 
excited utterance exception to correct these historical barriers.  Humans, 
psychological understanding,102 and society change over time.  As they do, so does 
the meaning and the interpretation of the exceptions. 
One must, nonetheless, guard against the great pitfalls in granting the courts too 
much discretion.  One scholar writes,  
If we used a rule similar to 403 to control the broad admissibility of 
hearsay, or if we have more fluid exceptions, we cede more power to 
judges.  The more open-ended a rule is, the more it is subject to differing 
                                                                
100Saltzburg, supra at note 26, at 43.  
There is no thermometer-type test for excited utterances; statements must be examined 
in light of all circumstances.  There is no time period, corroboration, or other 
thermometer-type test that will provide clear notice . . . to prosecutors and defense 
counsel as to statements that will qualify as excited utterances and those that will not.  
Judges will often have to assess the circumstances surrounding a statement in order to 
decide whether or not it is admissible.  Because the judge sits as a fact finder, 
appellate courts will defer to the judgment of a trial court on admissibility decisions.   
Id. 
101Id. at 42. “Although questions are not disqualifying, evasive answers or inconsistent 
statements may suggest that the stress of excitement has given way to contemplative answers.”  
Id. 
102Psychological processes are complex and constantly influenced by the level of 
psychological advancements; therefore, the lower level of understanding of psychology when 
the excited utterance exception was developed might not be applicable today.  See Orenstein, 
supra note 39, at 159-223. 
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interpretations.  The more a rule can be interpreted in various ways, the 
more power the interpreter has.103   
The scholar also writes of the possible slippery slope argument:  “Such an 
extension would greatly change our litigation.  It should mean that the hearsay about 
the incident for anyone who suffered violence, or perhaps the threat of violence, 
should be admissible.”104  True, there must be safeguards, but as we have seen from 
the current pattern of use of the excited utterance exception in case law, the 
preexisting evidentiary thresholds coupled with court discretion serve to weed out 
unreliable statements.105 
It is true that the most effective means of applying the law would be to provide a 
bright line rule explicitly delineating the boundaries of the excited utterance 
exception.  Such a bright line rule would, however, fail to take into account the true 
psychological considerations of possessing such an excited state as being unable to 
reflect and therefore fabricate excited statements.  The excited utterance is 
distinguishable from the bright line hearsay exceptions because it looks to the 
excited state of the declarant—and this subjective test necessarily requires the court 
to take a balancing approach.  Because hearsay is an all-or-nothing approach, it will 
necessarily exclude that which is trustworthy.  Therefore, hearsay exceptions based 
on discretionary balancing are the best available methods to reconcile the opposing 
rights of victims and criminal defendants and to provide a countervailing protection 
against the exacting nature of the hearsay rule.106  
VII.  RECENT CHANGES IN THE LAW THAT WILL CHANGE THE FUTURE LANDSCAPE 
FOR THE REEXCITED UTTERANCE ANALYSIS 
In Crawford v. Washington,107 a landmark Confrontation Clause case handed 
down in 2004, the Supreme Court found that it is a Constitutional violation under the 
Sixth Amendment to disallow the defendant from cross-examining the declarant 
                                                                
103Randolph N. Jonakait, “My God!  Is This How a Feminist Analyzes Excited Utterances? 
4 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 263, 286 (1997). 
104Id. at 290. 
105The proponent of the evidence, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, bears 
the burden of proof to establish that the declarant was excited.  See FED. R. EVID. 103(a).  
Therefore, the court must assess the corroborating evidence around the statement to determine 
whether the declarant was sufficiently excited.  “Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court.”  FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  Though the proponent of 
the evidence may attempt to bootstrap—that is, admit the statement under the excited 
utterance exception, claiming that the statement itself is evidence of the excitement—the 
hearsay protections are still present because the excitement must still be proven to the court by 
the preponderance standard before the court will admit such evidence.  Holland, supra note 
35, at 182 (“[U]nless some other evidence corroborates the complainant’s assertion of the 
startling event, the excited utterance alone would admit itself for its own truth.  This presents a 
rather convenient tautology: the statement becomes admissible simply because the 
complainant said it.”). 
106Orenstein, supra note 39, at 193. 
107541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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regarding his or her testimonial statement.  “Where testimonial statements are at 
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is 
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”108  This holding has 
profound effects on reexcitement cases involving statements made for a police 
investigation—such statements include those made while identifying the perpetrator 
at a line up or during a police interrogation.  Reexcitement is logically related to 
testimonial statements, for it is commonplace for a victim to become reexcited when 
recounting exciting events to law enforcement officials.  There have been cases 
where the courts have admitted testimonial statements under Napier’s reexcitement 
analysis;109 however, courts generally tend to disallow the evidence on facts that 
indicated that the statements were not made in an excited state.110   
Viewing the Napier in light of the recent Crawford decision, the potential 
dangers present in the reexcitement cases—namely, the discreet pressures and other 
societal influences in the period after the original exciting event—can be better 
evaluated and exposed through cross-examination.  The reasoning behind Napier and 
Bayne was tenuous because both cases failed to address the effect that intervening 
influences might have had on the reexcited statement.  Therefore, requiring that the 
defendant be given an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on testimonial 
statements partially mitigates the dangers present in the reexcitement analysis. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the reexcitement analysis has both benefits and detriments.  
Reexcitement may be a basis for admission of evidence in cases where the danger of 
influencing during the calm period is somehow obviated—as in the recent Crawford 
opinion.  Because of the heightened danger of undue influence in reexcitement cases, 
the courts should require corroborating evidence that the declarant did not confide in 
anyone during the intervening period of calm, to reduce the chance of outside 
pressures and influences.  Congress should provide an amendment to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence expressly allowing for reexcitement, but also requiring either 
physical corroborating evidence of the truthfulness of the statement or the declarant 
to be available for cross-examination—similar to Napier and the child abuse cases.  
Therefore, with the defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine, she may lead the fact 
finder to question the biased nature of the declarant’s statement.  Furthermore, the 
                                                                
108Id. 
109See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 774 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2002) (holding that 
statements made by the mother of the victim upon seeing the accused being arrested by police 
admissible under the excited utterance standard). 
110See, e.g., Portillo v. U.S., 710 A.2d 883, 885 (D.C. 1998) (though the victim-declarant 
saw the assailant immediately preceding her interview with police and was therefore reexcited, 
because she was calm in demeanor and evasive in her answers, her statements did not fall 
under the excited utterance exception); Biggins v. State, 73 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. App. 2002) 
(holding that although there had been a period of calm from the original event of molestation, 
the statements made by the 19-year-old victim to police officers were not a product of 
reexcitement, but part of the unbroken chain of resulting “emotions, excitement, fear, or pain 
resulting from the occurrence”); Mineo, 2001 WL 30184 at, *5 (citing Napier on the theory of 
reexcitement, but finding that although reexcitement is valid under the excited utterance 
exception, the details of domestic violence that the victim offered to the police officers were 
too “detailed and lengthy” and thus more likely to be the result of fabrication). 
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requirement of physical evidence that substantiates the excited statement also serves 
the same purpose. 
The uniqueness of the holdings of the reexcitement cases may be due to the 
severity and the egregiousness of the crimes, the substantial amount of circumstantial 
evidence that was available to buttress allegations of the defendants’ guilt, or the 
particularly sympathetic nature of the plaintiffs.111  Nevertheless, the reexcitement 
cases present profound questions regarding how much time constitutes enough time 
for “calm reflection” and what constitutes a “startling event or condition.”  
Ultimately, the reexcitement cases are an indicator of the high water mark of the 
excited utterance exception—an exception which has been deemed by some to be the 
“unofficial garbage pail of hearsay exceptions.”112  The Napier case and its progeny, 
applying the reexcitement analysis, scholarly commentary, and the ramifications of 
conclusions obtained from these combined sources have profound consequences on 
evidence law.  It uncertain whether reexcitement cases are to be categorized as 
merely a part of the expansion of the excited utterance exception, or as an anomaly 
analysis in a class of its own.  It is, however, certain that the modern day 
interpretation of the excited utterance marks a pattern of changing societal attitudes 
which reflect an increasing awareness of the distinct aspects of a victim’s 
psychological state. 
                                                                
111See Napier, 518 F.2d at 317-18. 
112See Orenstein, supra note 39, at 177. 
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